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ABSTRACT 
 
In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Supreme Court countenanced against 
treating the Second Amendment as a “second-class right.” Against this 
admonition, congressional defunding of federal restorative programs has 
rendered the amendment a second-class right for an ever-increasing and much-
maligned group of people: those who have been adjudicated as mentally ill. In 
a majority of states, those who have been involuntarily committed at any point 
in their lives to a mental health institution lose the right to bear arms for life. 
Taking guns out of the hands of those who have enjoyed decades of good mental 
health after a brief stint of treatment stigmatizes all who have battled mental 
illness and unfairly treats them as “second-class citizens,” undeserving of their 
constitutionally guaranteed rights. 
This Comment seeks to show that even in the ever-evolving jurisprudence of 
the Second Amendment, the lifetime ban currently imposed on this group fails 
under all forms of constitutional analysis. This Comment updates current 
scholarship by addressing two as-of-yet undiscussed circuit court cases and 
looking to the ascendent “historical approach” to Second Amendment 
challenges, in which courts look to the text, history, and tradition of the right to 
determine constitutionality. Then, it looks to tiered scrutiny, proposing that 
courts examine challenges to the current effective ban under the lens of strict 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Until immigrating to the United States at age two, Duy T. Mai lived in a Thai 
refugee camp.1 Since then, he has lived the quintessential American success 
story: Mai graduated from a prestigious west coast university with a 3.7 GPA in 
microbiology, and he later completed post-graduate studies on cancer research, 
receiving a graduate degree in microbiology.2 After obtaining his second degree, 
Mai moved to the state of Washington to research virology at a number of 
 
 1.  Mai v. United States (Mai II), 974 F.3d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 2020) (Bumatay, J., 
dissenting) (denying rehearing en banc). 
 2.  Id. 
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prestigious research centers throughout the state.3 In his home life, Mai is a 
father of two, he remains close to his extended family, and he regularly 
volunteers near his home.4 
But like more than seventeen million Americans,5 Mai has a history of 
depression. In 1999, at age seventeen, Mai was involuntarily committed to a 
mental health hospital for treatment, for which a state court adjudicated him as 
mentally ill and dangerous.6 Mai’s brief brush with depression thankfully 
passed. The following year, his commitment ended, and he has not needed 
treatment since.7 According to Mai, he has since completely recovered and no 
longer takes medication to control his previous condition.8 In support of his 
claim, it should be noted that Mai’s academic successes occurred after his 
commitment.9 Despite his post-commitment successes, his onetime brush with 
depression has irreversibly changed his legal status: his involuntary commitment 
means that both Washington10 and federal11 law bar him from legally purchasing 
a firearm. 
Undeterred, in 2014 Mai started the tortuous process of recouping his Second 
Amendment rights and reestablishing his name in the eyes of the law. In that 
year, he petitioned a Washington state court to restore his firearm rights to permit 
him to purchase a firearm for self-defense.12 To augment his petition, Mai 
gathered supportive declarations from medical and psychological experts 
testifying to his condition.13 The state court granted his petition under state law,14 
stating plainly that “[Mai] no longer presents a substantial danger to himself, or 
the public.”15 Mai’s rights, at least under state law, were restored. 
His rights under federal law have been another story altogether. After the 
restoration of his state rights, Mai attempted to pass a required background check 
to purchase a firearm but later received a phone call from the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) notifying him that the restoration of 
his state rights did not nullify his ban under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), which 
prohibits possession of firearms by those who have been involuntarily 
committed to a mental institution.16 The current federal statutory scheme permits 
states to opt in to a program in which their state reviewing bodies may lift the 
 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Major Depression, NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, 
https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/major-depression.shtml [https://perma.cc/4KUF-
B6AN]. 
 6.  Mai v. United States (Mai I), 952 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 7.  Appellant’s Opening Brief at 7, Mai I, 952 F.3d 1106 (No. 18-36071), 2019 WL 1580778, 
at *7. 
 8.  Id. at 8. 
 9.  Id. at 7.  
 10.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.047 (2020). 
 11.  18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). 
 12.  Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 7, at 8. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Mai v. United States (Mai I), 952 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 16.  Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 7, at 9. 
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federal ban on their citizens.17 But Washington, like the majority of states in 
2020, has not elected to opt in to the program.18 Effectively, because of a short, 
involuntary commitment more than twenty years ago, Mai can never purchase a 
firearm under federal law. The law stands on the shaky premise that once 
mentally ill, always mentally ill, and stigmatizes those like Mai who have 
overcome their bouts with depression. 
Unable to take advantage of restorative programs, Mai brought a Second 
Amendment suit in federal court to reestablish his rights,19 but he has lost in each 
of his cases. His legal struggles highlight two areas for concern in modern 
Second Amendment jurisprudence. First, the court’s analysis of his challenge to 
§ 922(g)(4) differs greatly from two factually similar cases outside of the Ninth 
Circuit where Mai brought his challenge, highlighting the bare unpredictability 
of modern Second Amendment jurisprudence.20 Second, and more narrowly, the 
effective lifetime ban on firearm possession by those involuntary committed for 
old and nonextant mental health concerns is unconstitutional under any of the 
current competing Second Amendment analyses. 
In Part II, this Comment will outline current Second Amendment 
jurisprudence. Part III will address Mai’s case and two other as-applied 
challenges to § 922(g)(4) that have reached the federal courts of appeals, all of 
which have resulted in different holdings. Part IV will show that the statute, as 
it stands, fails under the ascendent historical approach advanced by originalist 
judges since then-Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent in Heller v. District of Columbia, 
and Part V will show the same under the widely used tiered scrutiny approach. 
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF SECOND AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE 
The Second Amendment provides that, “A well regulated Militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear 
Arms, shall not be infringed.”21 The amendment is no model for clarity—one 
Second Amendment scholar noted that “[i]t’s almost as if James Madison, the 
author of the amendment, had just discovered this wonderful new thing, the 
comma, and wanted to put it in there as many times as possible.”22 For most part 
of its history, clauses and commas befuddled anyone trying to make sense of the 
amendment, and only a handful of Supreme Court cases shed any light on the 
one-sentence amendment. 
 
 17.  See infra Part II.D.1.  
 18.  NICS Act Record Improvement Program (NARIP) Awards FY 2009-2020, BUREAU OF 
JUST. STAT., https://bjs.ojp.gov/programs/nics-improvement-amendments-act/state-
profiles?tid=491&ty=tp#5is2kq [https://perma.cc/YLB9-43EM] (recording only twenty-two states 
taking part in the program in 2020); see also infra Part II.D. 
 19.  Mai v. United States, No. C17-0561, 2018 WL 784582, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 8, 2018). 
 20.  See infra Parts III.A–III.B (discussing the two cases). 
 21.  U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 22.  Radiolab Presents: More Perfect – The Gun Show, RADIOLAB, at 02:37 (Feb. 23, 2018), 
https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/radiolab/articles/radiolab-presents-more-perfect-gun-show 
[https://perma.cc/CR9J-489E]. 
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A. MILLER TO HELLER 
Not until the 2008 decision in District of Columbia v. Heller did the Supreme 
Court attempt to delineate the amendment’s scope. Until Heller, debate raged 
over whether the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and 
bear arms or, instead, a collective right protecting firearm use only in connection 
with militia service.23 In Heller, Justice Scalia resolved the individual- or 
collective-rights debate in favor of the former interpretation.24 Writing for the 
five-justice majority, Justice Scalia penned a well-researched originalist analysis 
of the Second Amendment, looking to dictionary definitions contemporary to 
the Constitution’s ratification,25 post-English Restoration militia laws,26 and late 
eighteenth-century state constitutions27 to conclude that the right conferred was, 
indeed, an individual one.28 To Justice Scalia, the amendment’s prefatory 
clause—providing that “[a] well regulated Militia being necessary to the security 
of a Free State”—serves only to announce the purpose for which the right to 
keep and bear arms was originally codified, and not to limit the operative clause 
to a collective right protecting only those serving in the militia.29 Next, 
highlighting the importance of self-defense weapons in the history of the Second 
Amendment,30 the majority held that the District of Columbia’s blanket ban on 
handgun possession, including those held in the home for self-defense, was 
constitutionally forbidden.31 The holding failed to settle the Second Amendment 
debate. 
For all that Justice Scalia did to clarify the rights debate, he left open the 
question of how to address future Second Amendment challenges. Answers to 
whether Justice Scalia prescribed a constitutional analysis for future challenges 
in his opinion are up-for-debate at best. Questions on the proper analysis are 
further complicated by the debate over how much deference to give Heller’s 
“presumptively lawful” bans.32 In noting the limits of the Second Amendment 
right at the end of the opinion, Justice Scalia gave his blessing to bans on 
possession by the mentally ill by giving it the label of presumptively lawful, but 
the claim went unsupported.33 In effect, the unsubstantiated sentence excuses 
 
 23.  See generally Brannon P. Denning, Can the Simple Cite Be Trusted?: Lower Court 
Interpretations of United States v. Miller and the Second Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 961, 972–
76 (1996) (discussing pre-Heller debate of the scope of the right). 
 24.  District of Columbia v. Heller (Heller I), 554 U.S. 570, 592–95 (2008). 
 25.  Justice Scalia used Samuel Johnson’s eighteenth-century dictionary to define both “arms” 
and “keep.” Id. at 581–82 (quoting 1 DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 106, 1095 (4th ed. 
1773) (reprt. 1978)). 
 26.  Id. at 593–95. 
 27.  Id. at 600–03. 
 28.  Id. at 595. 
 29.  Id. at 595, 599.  
 30.  Id. at 624–25 (quoting State v. Kessler, 614 P.2d 94, 98 (Or. 1980)) (“In the colonial and 
revolutionary war era, [small-arms] weapons used by militiamen and weapons used in defense of 
person and home were one and the same.”). 
 31.  Id. at 635. 
 32.  Id. at 626–27, 627 n.26. 
 33.  See id. (listing other presumptively lawful prohibitions in addition to the ban on 
possession by formerly mentally ill individuals, including bans on the possession of “dangerous 
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§ 922(g)(4)’s ban. Certainly, those who are currently mentally ill might be 
required to face some hurdles in firearm possession, but did Justice Scalia give 
a nod to lifetime bans based on little more than a period of mental illness in a 
person’s youth? Such a position is unlikely, given that the late justice’s opinion 
amounts to a sixty-three-page screed against a complete handgun ban. But the 
lack of a clearly defined analysis coupled with unsubstantiated dicta leaves a 
tangle of unsettled questions on Second Amendment doctrine, especially as it 
relates to the presumptively lawful categorical bans. 
The confusion has played out in the “presumptively lawful” ban under § 
922(g)(4). In fact, many post-Heller challenges to § 922(g)(4), though 
containing largely identical facts, have seen different results.34 Factoring in 
dissenting and concurring opinions, the list of hypothesized ways to resolve 
these as-applied challenges proves mind-numbingly complex and leaves even 
judges confused.35 To be sure, the Court has granted certiorari to a number of 
Second Amendment cases post-Heller, but none have resolved the debate 
surrounding the proper analysis,36 and lower courts have had to make sense of 
Heller on their own. 
B. TIERED SCRUTINY OR “TEXT, HISTORY, AND TRADITION”? 
“In Heller’s wake, two opposing points of view have emerged regarding [the] 
proper” analysis for Second Amendment challenges.37 All circuits have filled 
the gap by opting for a two-tiered analysis first pioneered by the Third Circuit 
in United States v. Marzzarella.38 Under this approach, courts first ask what level 
of scrutiny applies based on whether the statute burdens the Second 
Amendment’s core of lawful self-defense39 and then analyze the statute under 
 
and unusual” weapons, possession by felons, and the carrying of weapons in certain sensitive 
places); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) (reaffirming the list of 
presumptively lawful regulatory measures and explicitly extending the Second Amendment to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 34.  E.g., Mai v. United States (Mai I), 952 F.3d 1106, 1109, 1121 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding 
that § 922(g)(4) withstands intermediate scrutiny as applied to the plaintiff); Beers v. Att’y Gen. 
United States, 927 F.3d 150, 159 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Beers 
v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 2758 (2020) (mem.) (disposing of the challenge and upholding the statute under 
the first step of tiered scrutiny); Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t (Tyler II), 837 F.3d 678, 
699 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (applying intermediate scrutiny, finding that the plaintiff has a viable 
claim, and remanding to the district court). 
 35.  In the en banc opinion of Tyler, Judge Gibbons writes that “as [she] read[s] the 
opinions . . . at least twelve of [them] agree that intermediate scrutiny should be applied.” Tyler II, 
837 F.3d at 699 (emphasis added). 
 36.  See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 749–753; Caetano v. Massachusetts, 577 U.S. 411, 411–12 
(2016) (per curiam) (discussing the application of Heller to stun guns). 
 37.  Lindsay Colvin, History, Heller, and High-Capacity Magazines: What Is the Proper 
Standard of Review for Second Amendment Challenges?, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1041, 1043 
(2014). 
 38.  614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010). See generally Benjamin A. Ellis, Note, “Time Enough” 
for Scrutiny: The Second Amendment, Mental Health, and the Case for Intermediate Scrutiny, 25 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1325, 1343–47 (2017) (discussing in depth the circuit courts’ 
precedents). 
 39.  Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89–90. The Court in Heller stated that “[M]ost [Americans] 
undoubtedly thought [the Second Amendment] even more important for self-defense and hunting,” 
and the interest in self-defense “was the central component of the right itself.” District of Columbia 
COPYRIGHT © 2021 SMU LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
2021] Second-Class Right for Second-Class Citizens 187 
the requisite scrutiny.40 Despite the lack of direction in Heller, the court in 
Marzzarella read the landmark case to suggest such a tiered approach.41 Though 
it enjoys dubious approval in Heller, the approach presents a familiar analysis to 
judges used to analyzing tiered scrutiny in other constitutional claims. 
C. “TEXT, HISTORY, AND TRADITION”: THE HISTORICAL APPROACH 
By contrast, the historical approach resolves Second Amendment challenges 
by combing historical sources and striking down statutes for which no analogy 
can be found.42 The approach has not seen widespread approval in majority 
opinions, but a growing number of originalist judges have advocated its 
approach in dissents or concurrences, such that it may see approval over tiered 
scrutiny in the future. Advocates of the historical approach make much of Justice 
Scalia’s keen eye to the history of the Second Amendment in Heller when 
determining the scope of the right. They further maintain that Justice Scalia’s 
dive into the history of the amendment amounts to an analysis for lower courts 
to emulate in future cases that leaves no room for interest balancing.43 
In 2011, then-Judge Kavanaugh on the D.C. Circuit took up the flag for the 
historical approach and argued for its adoption in his dissenting opinion in Heller 
II.44 His dissent is frequently seen as the genesis of the revolt against tiered 
scrutiny. 
Three years after Heller, Heller II concerned the District of Columbia’s 
renewed attempt to regulate firearm possession. Following the first Heller case, 
the D.C. Council passed a slew of regulations that required firearm registration45 
and prohibited broadly defined categories of assault weapons46 and large-
capacity magazines.47 Although the registration requirements provided the 
avenue to gun ownership that Heller required, they created a protracted process 
for ownership that included, among other requirements, sufficient eyesight,48 a 
knowledge of local firearm laws,49 fingerprinting,50 and continued background 
checks.51 The assault-weapons ban was sweeping, covering certain semi-
automatic rifles, pistols, shotguns, and all semi-automatic firearms that included 
pistol grips or thumbhole stocks.52 The regulations, at least ostensibly, complied 
 
v. Heller (Heller I), 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008). 
 40.  Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Mai v. United States (Mai II), 974 F.3d 1082, 1087–88 (9th Cir. 2020) (Bumatay, J., 
dissenting). 
 43.  Id. at 1086 (Bumatay, J., dissenting). 
 44.  Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1270–71 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 45.  D.C. CODE § 7-2502.01(a) (2015). 
 46.  § 7-2502.02(a)(6). 
 47.  § 7-2506.01(b) (defining “large capacity” as holding more than ten rounds). 
 48.  § 7-2502.03(a)(11). 
 49.  § 7-2502.03(a)(10). 
 50.  § 7-2502.04(a). 
 51.  § 7-2502.07(d) (repealed 2012) (requiring background checks every six years). 
 52.  § 7-2501.01(3A)(A). 
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with Heller in that they provided Dick Heller and other D.C. residents an avenue 
for legal ownership of firearms for the purpose of self-defense. Even so, Heller 
and the co-plaintiffs in the case were each denied possession of certain weapons 
after compliance with the application process, and they brought suit against the 
regulations’ barriers to ownership and the outright ban on certain classes of 
weapons.53 
Dick Heller—often lionized by Second Amendment proponents for his 
successes in his first challenge54—was unable to repeat his earlier Supreme 
Court victory, losing at the D.C. Circuit on his Second Amendment arguments 
against assault-weapon and high-capacity-magazine bans.55 Judge Douglas H. 
Ginsburg looked to the freshly minted Heller opinion in support of the 
contention that the plaintiffs’ Second Amendment right was not without 
bounds.56 He then applied the widely accepted two-step analysis to the Second 
Amendment issue, looking to Heller to aid in determining the requisite level of 
scrutiny.57 Judge Ginsburg eventually settled on intermediate scrutiny but 
remanded the case to the district court to develop a fuller record on the novel 
requirements’ relation to government interests.58 The opinion was par for the 
course for current Second Amendment cases: the majority looked to Heller, and 
then it applied tiered scrutiny. 
While Heller’s second attempt failed to overturn the laws at issue, then-Judge 
Kavanaugh’s full-throated dissent has ensured that the case has a spot in the 
canon of gun-rights cases. Judge Kavanaugh disagreed with both the result of 
the case and the application of tiered scrutiny. To him, the proper route for 
Second Amendment analyses lies in the “text, history, and tradition” of the 
amendment and in appropriate historical analogues for novel weapons 
regulations, rather than judicial “re-calibrat[ion]” of the scope of the right 
through tiered scrutiny.59 Central to Judge Kavanaugh’s argument is that the 
historical test, which he underhandedly calls “the Heller test,” is “more 
determinate and ‘much less subjective’ because ‘it depends upon a body of 
evidence susceptible of reasoned analysis rather than a variety of vague . . . 
[p]rinciples whose combined conclusion can be found to point in any direction 
the judges favor.’”60 To him, his approach precludes judicial subjectivity. Under 
such an approach, Judge Kavanaugh would have held that the statutes at issue 
were unconstitutional because they were neither longstanding nor sufficiently 
 
 53.  Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 54.  Justin Wm. Moyer, ‘The Culture’s Changed’: Gun Rights Supporters Mark 10 Years 




 55.  Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1264. 
 56.  Id. at 1252. 
 57.  Id. at 1252–53. 
 58.  Id. at 1253, 1258–60. 
 59.  Id. at 1271 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 60.  Id. at 1274 (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 804 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
concurring)). 
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rooted in text, history, and tradition of the Second Amendment.61 
D. SECTION 922(G)(4)’S EFFECTIVE LIFETIME BAN 
Debate over the proper analysis has raged across Second Amendment 
challenges, but especially so in challenges to § 922(g)(4). Congress passed this 
and other gun-control statutes in 1968 in an effort to stem the number of high-
profile shootings that had marked the decade. Just five days after Lee Harvey 
Oswald assassinated President Kennedy in 1963 with a mail-order rifle, Senator 
Thomas Dodd from Connecticut led the charge for gun control by introducing 
legislation to restrict sales of firearms through the mails.62 Though the efforts of 
the initial Dodd bill came to nothing, Senator Dodd continued to introduce 
legislation at the request of President Johnson.63 Comprehensive legislation 
finally saw widespread support in 1968 after two more high-profile killings: the 
Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA) passed the Senate the month after the slaying 
of Martin Luther King, Jr. and passed the House the day after the assassination 
of Robert F. Kennedy.64 Congress declared that the GCA’s purpose was “to 
provide support to [f]ederal [and] [s]tate . . . law enforcement officials in their 
fight against crime and violence.”65 To that end, the GCA expanded the 
categories of congressionally defined groups proscribed from firearm 
possession, including felons and the mentally ill.66 
Including a ban on possession by the mentally ill, perhaps in some ways 
precipitated by the violence of the mid-1960s, extended the list of prohibited 
classes past pre-GCA regulations. Senator Dodd blamed violent television 
programs, extremist organizations, and the ease with which Americans can 
obtain firearms as contributing to a “sickness of violence.”67 Sickness, a byword 
for mental illness, was thus squarely within the GCA’s sights. No doubt Senator 
Dodd was thinking of “sick” assassins like Lee Harvey Oswald and James Earl 
Ray in his remarks. 
In order to hinder the sickness of violence, § 922(g)(4) provides that “[i]t shall 
be unlawful for any person who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or 
who has been committed to a mental institution” to possess or receive any 
firearm.68 The ATF regulations expand on the statute, defining one as 
“[a]djudicated as mental defective” if there has been a determination by a legal 
body that “a person, as a result of marked subnormal intelligence, or mental 
 
 61.  Id. at 1285. 
 62.  Jon Michaud, The Birth of the Modern Gun Debate, NEW YORKER (Apr. 19, 2012), 
https://www.newyorker.com/books/double-take/the-birth-of-the-modern-gun-debate 
[https://perma.cc/3QLM-QQMP]. 
 63.  Laura Smith, UNIV. OF CONN. LIBRS., Thomas J. Dodd and the Gun Control Act of 1968, 
CONN. HIST.ORG (Dec. 13, 2016), https://connecticuthistory.org/thomas-j-dodd-and-the-gun-
control-act-of-1968/ [https://perma.cc/4QPG-SZAG]. 
 64.  Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 133, 146–48 (1975). 
 65.  Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-618, § 101, 82 Stat. 1213, 1213 (1968). 
 66.  Zimring, supra note 64, at 149. 
 67.  114 CONG. REC. S16649 (daily ed. June 11, 1968) (statement of Sen. Dodd). 
 68.  18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). 
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illness, incompetency, condition, or disease” is a “danger to himself or others” 
or “[l]acks the mental capacity to contract or manage his own affairs.”69 The 
term “[c]ommitted to a mental institution,” at issue in the Mai case, includes 
involuntary commitments to mental institutions for mental defectiveness, mental 
illness, or “other reasons, such as for drug use.”70 
1. The Relief Program 
Of crucial importance to the statute’s unconstitutionality, the ban on firearm 
possession by those who have been adjudicated mentally ill was never meant to 
be permanent. The framers of the GCA had the foresight to provide an outlet for 
those barred by § 922(g)(4) to reattain their Second Amendment rights through 
application to the Attorney General.71 Such outlet, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 
925(c), grants to the Attorney General the ability to grant “relief from the 
disabilities imposed by Federal laws” after reviewing the circumstances of the 
applicant’s record and deciding “that the applicant will not be likely to act in a 
manner dangerous to public safety.”72 The Attorney General later delegated the 
authority to review these claims to the director of the ATF.73 In 1992, however, 
Congress defunded the program,74 and for fifteen years thereafter, all people like 
Mai were left without an avenue to regain their Second Amendment rights. 
In 2008, there was renewed hope for those like Mai wanting to restore their 
rights: that year Congress punted the issue of adjudicating relief to the states. In 
changes to the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) 
scheme,75 Congress gave states the power to grant relief from § 922(g)(4)’s ban 
if an authorized state body found that the individual would not pose a danger to 
public safety.76 States that created relief-granting bodies in compliance with 
Congress’s scheme became eligible for grant funding to assist in implementing 
such bodies.77 The congressional punt has proven only somewhat successful. 
The availability of grant funds has only attracted a handful of states: in 2020, 
only twenty-two states received funding.78 In all other states, formerly 
involuntarily committed persons are unable to regain their Second Amendment 
rights via any federal or state statutory or administrative route. The only option 
left for this class of individuals is to bring an as-applied Second Amendment 
challenge to the statute, a costly and flawed solution. Some applicants that have 
 
 69.  27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2019). 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-618, § 102, 82 Stat. 1213, 1224–26 (1968) (codified 
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 925). The original text provided for application to the Secretary of the 
Treasury. Id. 
 72.  18 U.S.C. § 925(c). 
 73.  28 C.F.R. § 0.130(a)(1) (2015). 
 74.  See Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1993, Pub. L. 
No. 102–393, 106 Stat. 1729, 1732 (1993). 
 75.  NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-180, § 105, 121 Stat. 
2559, 2569–70 (2008). 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. § 301, at 2571. 
 78.  See NICS Act Record Improvement Program (NARIP) Awards FY 2009-2020, supra note 
18. 
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brought Second Amendment claims have indeed received a federal 
reinstatement of rights. In a minority of cases, judges have interpreted 
“involuntary commitment” under § 922(g)(4) narrowly to avoid the deprivation 
of rights,79 and in others, judges have found the statute unconstitutional as 
applied.80 Although promising, adjudication of these claims on an as-applied 
basis is too costly for many potential plaintiffs, would clog federal dockets, and 
on a more fundamental level, serves as an unwieldy vehicle through which 
American citizens should be forced to rely to reinstate their rights. 
III. RECENT AS-APPLIED CASES AGAINST SCHEME OF § 922(G)(4) 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS 
These challenges to § 922(g)(4)’s effective lifetime ban have been met with 
mixed results. As mentioned, the three factually similar post-Heller challenges 
to § 922(g)(4) that have reached the federal circuit courts have reached markedly 
different conclusions. This Part will discuss the three cases and their outcomes. 
A. SIXTH CIRCUIT: TYLER V. HILLSDALE COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT 
The Sixth Circuit was the first circuit post-Heller to wrestle with a Second 
Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(4) in Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff’s 
Department.81 The state of Michigan’s failure to implement a relief program 
meant that Tyler was unable to purchase a firearm,82 but the district court 
dismissed his suit for failure to state a claim under the Second Amendment.83 In 
the panel decision on appeal, Judge Boggs disagreed with the lower court’s 
analysis. He settled on tiered scrutiny in keeping with the circuit’s precedent on 
Second Amendment challenges to categorical bans.84 Bound by the use of tiered 
scrutiny, Judge Boggs was free to choose the level of scrutiny as a matter of first 
impression for the circuit.85 Noting what he called “intermediate scrutiny’s 
shaky foundation in Second Amendment law”86 and that the strongest argument 
in its favor amounted to nothing more than its popularity among circuits in other 
categorical bans,87 Judge Boggs opted to examine the as-applied challenge under 
 
 79.  Franklin v. Sessions, 291 F. Supp. 3d 705, 723–24 (W.D. Pa. 2017) (avoiding the 
“seriousness of these constitutional issues” with regards to a lack of review in Pennsylvania through 
the canon of constitutional avoidance); United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2012) 
(“[W]e now conclude that section 922 should not be read to encompass a temporary hospitalization 
attended only by the ex parte procedures of section 3863.”). 
 80.  Keyes v. Sessions, 282 F. Supp. 3d 858, 878 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (“Enforcement of the statute 
against Keyes therefore violates his right to keep and bear arms—a right guaranteed to him by the 
Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.”). 
 81.  Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t (Tyler I), 775 F.3d 308, 311 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d 
en banc, 837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 82.  Id. at 313–15. 
 83.  Tyler v. Holder, No. 1:12-CV-523, 2013 WL 356851, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2013). 
 84.  Tyler I, 775 F.3d at 317–18 (citing United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 
2012)). 
 85.  Id. at 311. 
 86.  Id. at 330. 
 87.  Id. at 324. 
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strict scrutiny.88 He subsequently held that Tyler had stated a claim and 
remanded to the district court.89 
Judge Boggs’s opinion rankled his Sixth Circuit colleagues, who reviewed 
the case en banc. The en banc panel agreed that reversing the district court was 
proper, but it disagreed with Judge Boggs’s choice of strict scrutiny.90 In the first 
step of tiered scrutiny—whether the statute burdened conduct protected by the 
Second Amendment—the en banc panel rejected the government’s argument 
that Heller’s presumptively lawful language meant that § 922(g)(4) was per se 
constitutional.91 Instead, the court rightfully noted that the presumptively lawful 
category rested on ambiguous historical support, and it found that previously 
committed persons “are not categorically unprotected by the Second 
Amendment.”92 Consequently, § 922(g)(4), at least as applied to Tyler, burdened 
his Second Amendment right. Second, the en banc majority reasoned that risks 
inherent in firearms distinguish Second Amendment claims from other rights 
that use strict scrutiny,93 and it instead settled on the “near unanimous preference 
for intermediate scrutiny.”94 Noting that Tyler had a “viable claim” under the 
Second Amendment and citing an incomplete record, the court remanded the 
case to the district court for resolution.95 
In total, six concurrences and one dissent trade punches on the correct 
analysis, highlighting the judicial confusion post-Heller.96 In the same vein as 
Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent in Heller II, Judge Batchelder advocated for the 
historical approach in concurrence because, to her, two-step analyses “fail[] to 
give adequate attention to the Second Amendment’s original public meaning.”97 
Regardless, the majority opinion’s evenhanded approach that held Tyler had 
stated a claim in Tyler II provides the best approach of the three circuit-level 
opinions to ensure that plaintiffs have at least some avenue for a restoration of 
rights. Further, the opinion leaves little doubt as to the proper analysis for future 
as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(4) within the Sixth Circuit: judges are to 
employ a two-step analysis and use intermediate scrutiny. 
B. THIRD CIRCUIT: BEERS V. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES 
In the case of Beers v. Attorney General United States, the Third Circuit, like 
the Sixth before it, looked to a two-step inquiry to resolve the as-applied 
challenge to § 922(g)(4).98 The Third Circuit, though, employed a novel form of 
 
 88.  Id. at 328. 
 89.  Id. at 344. 
 90.  Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t (Tyler II), 837 F.3d 678, 699 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 91.  Id. at 688–90. 
 92.  Id. at 690. 
 93.  Id. at 691. 
 94.  Id. at 692. 
 95.  Id. at 699. 
 96.  Id. at 699–721. 
 97.  Id. at 702 (Batchelder, J., concurring). 
 98.  Beers v. Att’y Gen. United States, 927 F.3d 150, 153 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 
judgment vacated sub nom. Beers v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 2758 (2020) (mem.) (granting certiorari and 
remanding with instructions to dismiss the case as moot).  
COPYRIGHT © 2021 SMU LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
2021] Second-Class Right for Second-Class Citizens 193 
the two-step inquiry tailored specifically to categorical bans that replaces the 
first step of the inquiry with a two-part question. Under the Third Circuit’s 
formulation, the challenger must (1) identify the traditional justifications for the 
exclusion of his class from Second Amendment protections, and (2) present facts 
about himself that distinguish him from persons of the historically barred class.99 
This approach, the Binderup approach, explicitly invites challengers to present 
their medical histories as testament to their reformed status and serves as an 
ostensibly sympathetic route for the restoration of rights. 
But the Third Circuit’s opinion was anything but plaintiff-friendly. In the first 
step of the Binderup approach, the Third Circuit read the history of the rights of 
the mentally ill to say something entirely different than did the Sixth Circuit 
before it. Whereas the Sixth Circuit read history to stand for the proposition that 
mental illness did not conclusively justify a lifetime ban,100 the court in Beers 
concluded that the historical practice of disarming potentially dangerous persons 
justified § 922(g)(4).101 The panel downplayed the novelty of bans on firearm 
possession by the mentally ill by noting that similar laws would have been 
unnecessary in the eighteenth century, when judicial officials were free “to lock 
up . . . individuals with dangerous mental impairments” because they posed a 
danger to the public.102 In such a system, the mentally ill would have been unable 
to access firearms without the need for statutes.103 By analogy, the court 
reasoned that “if taking away a [mentally ill person]’s liberty was permissible, 
then . . . the lesser intrusion of taking his . . . firearms” should be no cause for 
concern.104 The court then looked to whether Beers had sufficiently 
distinguished himself from the historical group, decided that he had not, and 
upheld the lower court’s rejection of his challenge.105 
C. NINTH CIRCUIT: MAI V. UNITED STATES 
The majority opinion from the Ninth Circuit’s iteration of an as-applied 
challenge to § 922(g)(4) presents yet another different outcome from a largely 
similar factual scenario. In reviewing Mai’s Second Amendment challenge to 
the federal statute, the Ninth Circuit, like the two circuits before it, employed a 
two-step analysis.106 Under the first step, Mai urged the Ninth Circuit to follow 
Tyler II’s lead by finding that mental illness does not justify a lifetime ban and, 
consequently, that the statute burdened his Second Amendment right.107 The 
 
 99.  Id. at 155 (quoting Binderup v. Att’y Gen. United States, 836 F.3d 336, 346–47 (3d Cir. 
2016)). 
 100.  Tyler II, 837 F.3d at 689–90. 
 101.  See Beers, 927 F.3d at 157–58. 
 102.  Id. at 158 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in 
Search of A Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 
1377–78 (2009)). 
 103.  See id. 
 104.  Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Jefferies v. Sessions, 278 F. Supp. 3d 831, 841 
(E.D. Pa. 2017)). 
 105.  Id. at 158–59. 
 106.  Mai v. United States (Mai I), 952 F.3d 1106, 1113 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 107.  Id. at 1114. 
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court declined to decide one way or the other on the issue, however, and assumed 
without deciding that the statute burdened his rights.108 Although the court noted 
in Mai’s favor that “[t]hose who are no longer mentally ill . . . unquestionably 
pose less of a risk of violence” compared to when they were institutionalized,109 
it shot down the challenge under intermediate scrutiny because of the 
government’s interests in preventing crime and suicide.110 
In his dissenting opinion from the denial to rehear the Mai case en banc, Judge 
Bumatay took issue with the holding of the case and the application of tiered 
scrutiny, penning a strident but well-researched dissent arguing that the text, 
history, and tradition of the Second Amendment supported Mai’s contention that 
he should be allowed to own a firearm.111 The forcefulness of the dissent makes 
it a viable alternative to tiered scrutiny, and yet another potential candidate for 
as-applied challenge analyses. 
D. TAKING STOCK 
It is difficult to explain the three divergent majority opinions. Out of the three 
final opinions, Tyler II takes the most plaintiff-friendly friendly approach and 
suggests unconstitutional application, Beers expresses hostility towards 
restoration of rights for the once involuntarily committed, and Mai I gives 
deference to government interests. All three cases use a form of tiered scrutiny 
and settle on intermediate scrutiny, but Beers failed to pass step one, Mai failed 
to pass step two, and Tyler stated a viable claim under both steps such that it was 
necessary to remand. The spectrum of possibilities only increases when 
factoring in the cases’ dissents, concurrences, and nonfinal judgements. 
The Sixth Circuit in Tyler II came closest to correctly recognizing that the 
effective lifetime ban under § 922(g)(4) is an unconstitutional infringement on 
the Second Amendment rights of those who have enjoyed years of good mental 
health after involuntary commitment. Such a ban fails under the historical 
approach advanced by then-Judge Kavanaugh, and it is too broad to survive 
tiered scrutiny, as will now be demonstrated in turn. 
IV. SECTION 922(G)(4) PROVES UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE 
HISTORICAL APPROACH 
Judges looking to the text, history, and tradition of the Second Amendment 
should strike down these as-applied challenges as unconstitutional. To repeat, 
no circuit court has adopted this approach, but it has enjoyed ascendent levels of 
approval in dissent such that it may feature in a majority opinion in the future. 
 
 108.  Id. at 1114–15. 
 109.  Id. at 1121. 
 110.  Id. at 1116. 
 111.  Mai v. United States (Mai II), 974 F.3d 1082, 1085–88 (9th Cir. 2020) (Bumatay, J., 
dissenting). 
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A. HISTORY OF STATUTES BANNING POSSESSION 
Put bluntly, laws banning possession by the involuntarily committed do not 
enjoy a historical pedigree, with one commentator noting that “[o]ne searches in 
vain through eighteenth-century records to find any laws specifically excluding 
the mentally ill from firearms ownership.”112 The closest historical support lies 
in two state laws from the 1880s, which do not specifically target the mentally 
ill but rather ban possession by those of an “unsound mind.”113 Such laws did 
not see wider approval until the 1930s when a small number of states adopted 
the American Bar Association’s Uniform Firearms Act, which “prohibited 
delivery of a pistol to any person of ‘unsound mind.’”114 In addition to a flimsy 
pedigree, these statutes may not even serve as proper anologues. As another 
scholar has noted, the definition of unsound mind suggests a permanent 
condition instead of a temporary one, like mental illness, which can often be 
remedied with medical assistance.115 
As discussed in Part II, supra, the history of § 922(g)(4) is not longstanding: 
Congress passed § 922(g)(4) in the late 1960s, a mere forty years before Heller. 
Even then, the ban was not meant to be permanent, as the relief scheme gave 
those categorically banned the opportunity to prove their return to mental 
sanity.116 Only in 1992 did the ban become effectively permanent, and even then, 
the changes to the scheme were intended to keep guns out of the hands of felons, 
not the mentally ill.117 
B. HISTORICAL ANALOGIES 
If no direct historical precedent can be found, judges are next to “reason by 
analogy from history and tradition.”118 To be sure, finding a direct analogue for 
§ 922(g)(4) is likely fruitless because, as the court in Beers noted, such bans 
were historically unnecessary owing to the practice of institutionalization in the 
colonial and early periods of America,119 which obviated the need for statutes 
 
 112.  Larson, supra note 102, at 1376. 
 113.  Mark Frassetto, Firearms and Weapons Legislation up to the Early Twentieth Century 
76–77 (Jan. 15, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) , https://ssrn.com/abstract=2200991 
[https://perma.cc/K2V3-68WU] (first citing 1881 Fla. Laws 87, chap. 3285, § 1; and then citing 
1883 Kan. Sess. Laws 159 § 1). 
 114.  Larson, supra note 102, at 1376–77. Pennsylvania, for example, adopted the uniform 
statute in the 1930s. Mai II, 974 F.3d at 1089. 
 115.  Nash E. Gilmore, A Bridge Over Troubled Water: The Second Amendment Guarantee for 
the Previously Mentally Institutionalized, 86 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 1, 26 (2017) (citing Unsound Mind, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910)) (noting that the Black’s Law definition of “unsound 
mind” refers to “an adult who from infirmity of mind is incapable of managing himself or his 
affairs”).  
 116.  See supra Part II. 
 117.  See Gilmore, supra note 115, at 22–23 (discussing what Gilmore calls the accidental 
restriction). Gilmore notes that Senate hearings reveal a concern with felon possession. Id. In those 
hearings, Senator Simon stated that “[t]he goal of this provision has always been to prohibit 
convicted felons from getting their guns back . . . .” Id. at 23 n.119 (quoting 142 CONG. REC. 27,066 
(1996)). 
 118.  Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 119.  Beers v. Att’y Gen. United States, 927 F.3d 150, 157–58 (3d Cir. 2019). 
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on societal behavior. In the Enlightenment period, the asylum quickly became 
the primary approach to treat the mentally ill.120 As the Beers court noted, 
judicial officials in this asylum-based system were free “to ‘lock up’ . . . 
individuals with dangerous mental impairments,” such that laws on firearm 
possession were unnecessary.121 Institutionalization became “an object of 
praise” in the eighteenth century and continued as the dominant remedy for 
mental health until the mid-twentieth century, when doctors came to see 
medication as the primary means of combatting mental illness.122 In sum, there 
simply was no need for statutes on how to deal with the mentally ill at the time 
of our nation’s founding until some 200 years had elapsed. 
Instead, one must look to historical analogy,123 for which institutionalization 
is the proper analogue to modern bans on possession by the mentally ill. In the 
period of institutionalization, the loss of rights associated with mental illness 
lasted only as long as a person’s commitment. Judge Bumatay notes in his Mai 
II dissent that a Lockean understanding of reason and rights can shed light on 
the historical relationship between temporary commitment and the 
commensurate loss of rights.124 To Locke, rights attach to those who have 
attained “reason,” and those rights can be stripped only for the duration that a 
person has lost reason.125 The link therein to mental health lies in the fact that 
colonial health experts treated mental illness as a temporary loss of reason.126 
State laws on the subject are in accord. Early Virginia laws limited rights to 
“lunatics” only “during their state of insanity.”127 As one treatise puts it, “a 
lunatic [was] never to be looked upon as irrecoverable.”128 
Although no direct historical analogue exists, a Lockean understanding of 
rights supports the idea that a loss of rights should last no longer than the period 
of loss of reason. Using such an approach as our historical analogue in the 
absence of similar statutes, then, § 922(g)(4) is unconstitutional. 
V. TIERED SCRUTINY 
Courts, at least for the foreseeable future, are much more likely to resolve 
challenges to § 922(g)(4)’s prohibition on firearm possession by the mentally ill 
on the basis of tiered scrutiny. All circuits currently employ some form of 
 
 120.  MICHELLE O’REILLY & JESSICA NINA LESTER, EXAMINING MENTAL HEALTH THROUGH 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM: THE LANGUAGE OF MENTAL HEALTH 35 (2017). 
 121.  Beers, 927 F.3d at 158 (citing Larson, supra note 102, at 1377–78). 
 122.  O’REILLY & LESTER, supra note 120, at 36–40. 
 123.  See Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1275. 
 124.  Mai v. United States (Mai II), 974 F.3d 1082, 1089 (9th Cir. 2020) (Bumatay, J., 
dissenting). 
 125.  Id. (citing JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1691), reprinted in 4 JOHN 
LOCKE, THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 207, 339, 342 (12th ed. 1824)). 
 126.  Id.  
 127.  Id. (citing 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF 
REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 145 (1803)). 
 128.  Id. (citing ANTHONY HIGHMORE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IDIOCY AND LUNACY 73 
(1807)). 
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scrutiny for as-applied Second Amendment challenges to categorical bans, with 
the historical approach seeing daylight only in dissent. That being said, history 
has a place in the two-step analysis. In the words of the Ninth Circuit, the first 
step of the tiered-scrutiny analysis requires courts “to explore the amendment’s 
reach based on a historical understanding of the scope of the Second Amendment 
right.”129 The second step of the analysis, on the other hand, looks to the 
government interests in passing the statutes and the scientific data undergirding 
those interests.130 
A. GOVERNMENT INTERESTS AT STAKE 
As-applied challenges to firearm bans under § 922(g) frequently feature 
litigants duking it out over medical studies to bolster, or undercut, alleged 
government interests. For § 922(g)(4) specifically, those interests are almost 
always prevention of crime and suicide.131 These interests are indisputably 
laudable, and few would likely take umbrage at their classification as compelling 
or legitimate.132 At the same time, the government must be able to establish a fit 
between those objectives and the current lifetime ban on the possession of 
firearms under § 922(g)(4)133 without resorting to “mere anecdote and 
supposition.”134 This the government cannot do. Studies often prove a higher 
short-term propensity for violence or suicide post-release for certain subsets of 
the community suffering from mental health conditions.135 But those trends are 
simply not borne out in studies of those who have enjoyed decades of good 
mental health after involuntary commitment. Upholding § 922(g)(4)’s ban 
despite that fact undercuts the Ninth Circuit’s “emphatic[]” rejection of “the 
notion that ‘once mentally ill, always so.’”136 In the words of the Tyler II court, 
the proffered studies do not justify a lifetime bar to a fundamental right for a 
person who was “involuntarily committed many years ago and who ha[s] no 
history of intervening mental illness, criminal activity, or substance abuse.”137 
The ninetieth Congress would agree, since it never actually intended the GCA 
to be a lifetime ban on possession when it passed the Act in 1968.138 
 
 129.  Mai v. United States (Mai I), 952 F.3d 1106, 1114 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 130.  Id. at 1116–17.  
 131.  See, e.g., id. at 1116; Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t (Tyler I), 775 F.3d 308, 331 
(6th Cir. 2014). 
 132.  United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) (“There is no doubt that preventing 
danger to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal.”); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 
458, 473 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Although the government’s interest need not be ‘compelling’ under 
intermediate scrutiny, cases have sometimes described the government’s interest in public safety 
in that fashion.”). 
 133.  Tyler I, 775 F.3d at 331. 
 134.  Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t (Tyler II), 837 F.3d 678, 694 (6th Cir. 2016) 
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting United States v. Carter, 669 F.3d 411, 418 (4th Cir. 2012)). 
 135.  Id. at 694–96 (discussing research on formerly involuntarily committed people’s risk for 
violence and suicide risk).  
 136.  Mai I, 952 F.3d at 1121. 
 137.  Tyler II, 837 F.3d at 699. 
 138.  See supra Part II.D. 
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1. Crime Prevention 
Neither studies on the government interest of crime prevention nor scare 
tactics on the dangers posed by the mentally ill warrant a lifetime ban on firearm 
possession. Eliciting the names of mass shooters with histories of mental health 
problems, as the government did in Tyler I, does nothing to prove why all 
persons with past mental health problems deserve a lifetime ban and serves only 
to further stigmatize this class of Americans. The government in Tyler I unfairly 
drew parallels between the plaintiff and the Virginia Tech shooter, who had a 
mental health history that should have disqualified him from being able to pass 
a background check.139 In that case, a disconnect between state and federal 
reporting systems led to his being able to purchase the firearms that ultimately 
killed thirty-two students in 2007.140 This fact may underscore the importance 
of effective background check systems, but such an analogy to Tyler amounts to 
dishonesty. On the one hand, the Virginia Tech shooter had revered the 
Columbine massacre in middle school,141 written violent stories in his college 
English classes,142 and grown so hostile in class that his classmates stopped 
attending lectures.143 Tyler, by comparison, had a brief depressive episode in 
1985 after his “wife of twenty-three years ran away with another man, depleted 
[his] finances, and then served him with divorce papers,” and for the next thirty 
years he experienced no problems.144 
Most medical studies are similarly ill-suited to justify lifetime bans. One 
frequently cited scientific study found an increased propensity for reported 
assaultive weapon use for 11.1% of former mental health patients compared to 
only 2.7% of the never-treated control group.145 Yet when the researchers 
adjusted their findings for psychotic symptoms, they found that “much of the 
difference between mental patient groups and the never-treated group in rates of 
relatively recent violent/illegal behavior can be explained by the level of 
psychotic symptoms.”146 In effect, the study only shows that those who have 
been committed and who are still exhibiting symptoms of mental health problems 
pose an increased risk. At any rate, the category of former patients in the study 
is overbroad, including any former patient who has not gone to mental health 
counseling in the past year,147 and is subsequently an inapt comparison for those 
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like Mai that have not needed counseling for decades. An often cited meta-
analysis of five studies shows that 0.3% of schizophrenics committed homicide 
compared to 0.02% of the general population—a fifteen-fold increase.148 But 
schizophrenia is a “lifelong brain disorder,”149 and while the study may weigh 
against restoration of Second Amendment rights to schizophrenics, it does little 
to prove the same for temporary depressive episodes. When looking to the 
broader spectrum of mental health disorders, one study’s “most unexpected 
finding” was the sharp decline in violent activity over time.150 In that same study, 
when controlling for substance-abuse problems, the researchers found that “the 
rates of violent acts perpetrated by involuntarily committed patients and the 
general population [of the study’s community were] ‘statistically 
indistinguishable.’”151 Not surprisingly, the authors of one law review article 
wrote that, collectively, studies that track mental health patients without 
substance-abuse disorders “suggest that only the seriously mentally ill or those 
with psychosis are more violent.”152 
According to the studies, only certain subsections of the community afflicted 
by mental health problems pose an increased risk. Those subsets are not 
nebulous groupings or ill-defined categories, but rather they are those that suffer 
from certain conditions like psychosis or schizophrenia, or suffer from comorbid 
addictions like alcohol or drug decencies.153 With a thumbs-up from a physician 
confirming a clean bill of mental health, there simply is no scientific basis 
linking increased criminality to those like Mai or Tyler. 
2. Suicide Prevention 
The government’s interest in preventing self-harm among those with mental 
health problems further buttresses Congress’s reasons for § 922(g)(4).154 Like 
the prevention of crime, the interest here similarly enjoys Supreme Court 
recognition.155 But like the shaky support from criminality studies, the studies 
on suicide rates do not justify rigid lifetime bans on constitutional rights. For 
example, one government-cited meta-analysis in Tyler II shows a suicide risk 
for involuntarily committed patients at “thirty-nine times that expected,” but the 
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risks were highest following first admissions.156 In fact, suicide risk diminishes 
after the beginning of treatment, with “many papers” concurring in that point.157 
To be sure, mental health disorders and suicide rates share a disquieting 
relationship—at least “[n]inety percent . . . of suicide victims in the United 
States suffered from mental illness.”158 The same government-cited meta-
analysis study found that suicide risk for individuals with psychiatric diagnoses 
was eleven times that of individuals without any diagnosis.159 But again, 
unqualified numbers may blur the reality of suicide in communities afflicted by 
mental health concerns. In the meta-analysis, the highest incidence of suicide 
occurred in the year immediately following consultation and in those with a 
history of suicide attempts, suggesting that the rates for people like Mai and 
Tyler are, in reality, much lower.160 The high incidence of suicide in the first 
year is borne out in a recent meta-analysis that shows drop-offs in suicide rates 
postdischarge.161 
In sum, studies on crime and suicide within the community of mental health 
disorders undoubtedly reveal troubling numbers across the board. But there lies 
the rub: across the board studies do not reflect statistics for people who are many 
years removed from their involuntary commitment and have suffered no 
symptoms since their initial episodes. In litigation, the government has, as of 
yet, been unable to prove the contrary. Given the paucity of data to justify the 
categorical and rigid lifetime ban on a constitutional right, as-applied challenges 
under the right facts prevail under any level of scrutiny. 
B. STRICT SCRUTINY 
Strict scrutiny is a high standard of review, which Justice Thomas has stated 
proves “automatically fatal in almost every case.”162 Laws that involve 
fundamental rights in due process claims,163 for example, are examined under 
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strict scrutiny, and they pass muster only if the law is “the least restrictive means 
of achieving a compelling state interest.”164 Most circuit courts’ Second 
Amendment jurisprudence follows a model in which the decision between strict 
and intermediate scrutiny hinges on “the nature of the conduct being regulated 
and the degree to which the challenged law burdens the right.”165 
The general consensus is that § 922(g)(4) is not subject to strict scrutiny. Only 
one court has applied strict scrutiny, but it was vacated in en banc review166—
no court has applied it since. Even so, judges have not shied from advocating its 
use in dissenting opinions.167 The argument goes that the statute’s effective 
lifetime ban not only strikes at the Second Amendment’s core interest in 
protecting the right for “law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense 
of hearth and home,” but that it guts it.168 What is more is that the statute’s 
effective ban targets a narrow class of individuals—the very reason for which 
the Court began building its heightened scrutiny jurisprudence in the first 
place.169 Finally, judges see strict scrutiny as being in accordance with the high 
pedestals on which both Heller and McDonald place the right.170 
In the event that a court examines the statute under strict scrutiny, it should 
fail because it is not narrowly tailored. As it stands, all formerly involuntarily 
committed persons in a majority of states are banned from owning firearms, even 
though studies show that not everyone in this group poses increased risks of 
suicide or crime. Congress recognized the overinclusivity of this ban when it 
passed the original GCA and included a fully funded relief program in order to 
separate those that no longer pose risks from those that do. Because Congress’s 
restorative outlet to avoid overinclusivity is now available in only a minority of 
states, in all other states the ban is overinclusive. NICS data published in 2021 
reveals over 6.5 million persons are prohibited from purchasing firearms under 
§ 922(g)(4).171 Some portion of that group can certainly petition state restorative 
bodies because they live in states with these programs, though the exact number 
is unclear because the NICS data is not subdivided by state. Yet data from states 
like Massachusetts, for example, illustrate the overinclusivity of the ban. The 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts does not receive federal funding to conduct 
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restorative bodies,172 despite suffering from some of the highest rates of 
involuntary commitment from those states studied.173 Without a restorative 
body, some 48,000 Massachusettsans lose their Second Amendment rights for 
life each year.174 What is more is that the number of Americans who lose their 
rights is on the rise. A recent study on rates of involuntary commitment—the 
first study of its kind—revealed an uptick in such commitments from 2012 
through 2016 of 13.1%.175 With such an increase, more Americans each year 
will permanently lose their rights. 
C. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY 
The statute similarly fails under intermediate scrutiny.176 Courts that elect not 
to subject § 922(g)(4) to strict scrutiny will likely analyze it under intermediate 
scrutiny,177 as it curries favor with the majority of judges in federal circuits when 
reviewing Second Amendment challenges.178 Intermediate scrutiny is less 
exacting than strict scrutiny, requiring that the government set forth an 
“important governmental objective” and that the statute is “substantially related” 
to serve that interest.179 Due to its less exacting standard, intermediate scrutiny 
provides some wiggle room, and “the government need not prove that there is 
‘no burden whatsoever on [the claimant’s] . . . right under the Second 
Amendment.’”180 
Conceding that crime and suicide prevention constitute important government 
interests, the question becomes one of fit. As with the discussion of strict 
scrutiny, § 922(g)(4) is unconstitutional because of its overbreadth in classifying 
persons no longer exhibiting symptoms of their mental illness with those that are 
currently mentally ill, and imposing a lifetime ban on all. To be sure, overbreadth 
does not automatically render a statute unconstitutional under intermediate 
scrutiny. In fact, the Supreme Court’s formulation of intermediate scrutiny does 
not require the fit to be necessarily perfect, but the fit must nonetheless prove 
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substantial.181 Courts analyzing these as-applied challenges recognize that the fit 
between the statute and government interests is not substantial: in an as-applied 
challenge to § 922(g)(4), one federal district court noted that “[w]e have been 
presented with no evidence to indicate that disarming those who went through a 
period of mental illness and suicide attempts over a decade ago . . . reasonably 
fits within the governmental interest.”182 
D. EXTRA-JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS 
Although the statute fails as it is applied to the formerly involuntarily 
committed under tiered scrutiny and the historical approach, relying on plaintiffs 
to bring as-applied challenges that will likely be appealed is a short-term fix that 
fails to correct the root of the problem. Only those that have the time and money 
to bring suit against the government can realistically bring these challenges that 
may go through years of litigation and rounds of appellate review.183 Even for 
those that have the resources, potential challengers may be disincentivized to 
disclose their history of mental illness in court. 
A better solution lies in refunding the federal relief-from-disabilities program 
that the GCA created in 1968. Such a system would foster uniformity and ensure 
that citizens of all states have a route to restore their Second Amendment rights. 
Alternatively, Congress could retool the current state incentive program to 
encourage more than just twenty-two states to participate.184 As other 
commentators have noted, the federal relief program “cost[s] the government 
$3,700 to process each application, which is a small amount of money . . . when 
weighed against protecting an individual’s right guaranteed to him by the 
Constitution.”185 
E. ENDING THE STIGMA 
As a matter of policy, ending the effective lifetime ban may go hand-in-hand 
with reducing the stigma of mental illness. The stigma of mental illness both 
“denigrates the value of people who have a mental illness” and “creates 
inequities in funding and service delivery that undermine recovery and full 
social participation.”186 Studies on the topic link mental-illness stigma to a 
perception that those who are afflicted are “dangerous, unpredictable, different, 
and to be blamed for their condition.”187 Those that suffer feel the 
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disapprobation: public disapproval can be associated with “lower self-esteem, 
depression, feeling misunderstood and ashamed, poor medication adherence, 
fewer successful social interactions, reduced help seeking, worse recovery, 
lower quality of life (QOL), fewer job opportunities, inadequate health coverage, 
and fewer leased apartments.”188 
In the wake of highly publicized shootings in the 2010s—Sandy Hook 
Elementary; Aurora, Colorado; and the Arizona attack that left six dead and U.S. 
Representative Gabrielle Gifford injured—pro-Second Amendment lobbying 
groups turned to the mentally ill as a scapegoat.189 The National Rifle 
Association’s Wayne LaPierre, in discussing a national database of the mentally 
ill, spoke about the existence of “genuine monsters [who are] so deranged, so 
evil, so possessed by voices and driven by demons, that no sane person can 
ever[] possibly comprehend them.”190 Efforts to curb violence are laudable, but 
such rhetoric does nothing but sensationalize the overstated link between mental 
illness and violence.191 
But societal distrust of the mentally ill can be mitigated through legislative 
reforms that improve protections for this class.192 In addition to righting a 
constitutionally impermissible wrong, requiring states to conduct holistic 
examinations of applicants seeking to regain their Second Amendment rights 
would reduce the feelings of being devalued, dismissed, and dehumanized by a 
system that codifies sentiments expressed by Wayne LaPierre. Repealing a law 
that casts all of those once adjudicated to be mentally ill into one category and 
replacing it with a system that looks at each person as an individual restores a 
sense of belonging and fitting with society.193 Psychiatric studies concur: lower 
rates of self-stigma (the internalization of society’s negative stereotypes) 
correlates to improved outcomes down the road.194 
VI. CONCLUSION 
When Congress defunded the federal restorative program in 1992,195 it 
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effectively created a lifetime ban on firearm possession by those that have, at 
some point in their lives, been involuntarily committed to a mental health 
institution. Such a ban upholds the misguided notion that “once mentally ill, 
always so”196—a notion that is belied by studies on the governmental interests 
at stake. 
Second Amendment jurisprudence stands on uncertain grounds in recent 
years given the unpredictability of judicial analysis. Justice Scalia’s 
pronouncement on the presumptive validity of statutes like § 922(g)(4) only 
serves to muddy waters. Simply put, the statute does not enjoy the historical 
pedigree that Heller assumed, and scientific studies call into question whether 
the statute serves the asserted government interests of suicide and crime 
prevention at all. Though it is perhaps high time that the Supreme Court takes 
up another Second Amendment case to pass judgment on the correct analysis of 
the right, courts in the immediate future should find that the statute offends a 
“fundamental right necessary to our system of ordered liberty”197 under either a 
historical or tiered-scrutiny analysis. Alternatively, Congress should retool the 
current restorative body framework to ensure that Americans in all states have 
access to some form of redress. 
People like Mai and Tyler who have enjoyed many years of clean mental 
health since an involuntary commitment deserve to have their rights restored. 
The Second Amendment is not a second-class right, and formerly committed 
Americans are not second-class citizens—finding § 922(g)(4) unconstitutional 
would put into practice these two common-sense ideals. 
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